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I. INTRODUCTION

For many years, courts and commentators have been concerned
about a phenomenon in class action litigation referred to as objector
"blackmail."1 The term "blackmail" is used figuratively rather than
literally; so-called objector "blackmail" is simply a specific application
of the general concern with legal regimes that permit one or more
individuals to "hold out" and disrupt collective action. 2 The holdout
problem in class action litigation stems from the following series of
events: When a class action is settled, class members who do not like
the proposed settlement are permitted to file objections with the
federal district court that must approve it. If the district court
nonetheless approves the settlement, the class members who filed
objections have the right to appeal the district court's approval. If
objectors appeal the settlement, however, the final resolution of the
settlement will be delayed during the time it takes the court of
appeals to decide the appeal, which can be years. Not only does the
appeal delay final resolution of the settlement, but, more importantly
for the blackmail problem, it also delays the point at which class
counsel can receive their fee awards, which are contingent upon the
settlement. As class counsel are eager to receive these fees, they are
willing to pay objectors out of their own pockets to drop the appeals.
This, it is thought, has led class members to file wholly frivolous
objections and appeals for no other reason than to induce these side
payments from class counsel. 3 These appeals are what courts and
commentators refer to as objector "blackmail."4
Class members have to be fairly savvy to take advantage of this
scheme. But the large stakes involved in big class action settlements
have drawn just those savvy class members. Like class actions
themselves, objector blackmail is generally lawyer driven. Some
1.
See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness
Guarantors,2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 403, 438-42 (providing a summary of several scholarly and
judicial commentaries on objector "blackmail").
2.

See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25

(2004) (discussing holdout problem in the context of eminent domain).
3.
See, e.g., Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 507 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2007) ("In
some circumstances objectors may use an appeal as a means of leveraging compensation for
themselves or their counsel."); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.08

(Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 1, 2009) (expressing concern with "fees paid to objectors' counsel not
because of valid objections but because objectors have threatened to prolong the process by
appealing the settlement . . . thereby delaying distributions to . . . class counsel"); id. (listing

citations to commentators who have discussed "the improper role that objectors sometimes play
in holding up legitimate settlements").
4.
Although the term is figurative, I will follow the conventional terminology and refer to
the holdout phenomenon in class action litigation as objector "blackmail."
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lawyers are said to be "professional objectors" who travel from
settlement to settlement seeking class members on behalf of whom
they can object. In other instances, objections are filed in furtherance
of rivalries between lawyers seeking to control class action litigation;
lawyers representing class members in competing actions may object
in the settling actions in order to share in the fee awards. 5
Courts and commentators believe that objector blackmail is a
serious problem. Objector blackmail is often seen as something of a
"tax" that class action lawyers must pay in order to settle class action
litigation,6 and it has been decried in numerous court opinions 7 and
scholarly commentaries. 8 As one commentator has put it, class action
objectors are "the least popular parties in the history of civil
procedure."9 The blackmail concern has led courts and commentators
to propose a variety of measures designed to mitigate the threat of
objector blackmail. Perhaps the most draconian among these
measures is the recent practice by some district courts to require
objectors to post bonds under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 7
for hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in order to
appeal class action settlements-something few objectors, no matter
what their motivations, are in a position to do. 10
In this Article, I bring to light a current practice among class
action lawyers that neutralizes much of the blackmail threat, a
practice known as "quick pay." As far as I am aware, this practice has
never been acknowledged by any court nor any commentator. The
practice works as follows: With the consent of the defendants, class
counsel insert provisions into class action settlements that permit
counsel to receive whatever fees district courts award them as soon as
those courts approve the settlements, regardless of whether the
settlements are appealed. If the settlements or fee awards are
reversed on appeal, then class counsel agree to refund the fees to the
defendants. The virtue of the quick-pay provision is that objectors who
bring meritless appeals can no longer delay the point at which class
counsel receive their fees. Thus, class counsel have little incentive to
pay objectors a premium to avoid this delay. As such, quick-pay
provisions can reduce the "holdout tax" that blackmail objectors can
5.
See infra text accompanying notes 68-70.
6.
Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at
*3-4 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) ("[P]rofessional objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on class
action settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to the objectors.").
7.
See infra notes 58-62.
8.
See infra notes 63-67.
9.
Brunet, supra note 1, at 472.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 75-76, 110-25.
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extract in class action litigation. Quick-pay provisions are not only
already in use, but they are already in wide use. Drawing on an
original dataset I created consisting of all class action settlement
agreements approved by federal district courts in 2006,11 I show that
over one-third of all settlements in 2006 included quick-pay
provisions, including almost 80 percent of securities cases.
In my view, there is little doubt that the quick-pay provision is
a better solution to the blackmail problem than those solutions
proposed by courts and commentators. Although one might object to
quick-pay provisions on the ground that they are utterly self-servingthey have, after all, transformed class action lawyers into something
that had been previously unknown in the law: contingency-fee lawyers
that get paid before their clients-I argue that they may actually do
more good than harm to class members. Moreover, compared to the
alternative mechanisms that have been proposed for mitigating
blackmail-sanctioning objections later deemed to be frivolous or
requiring objectors to post Rule 7 bonds for hundreds of thousands or
millions of dollars-quick-pay provisions clearly seem more desirable.
Ex post sanctions and large Rule 7 bonds will inevitably chill
legitimate objectors from making their views known to the district
court. That is a steep price to pay when the only adversarial testing of
class action settlements comes from objectors. Moreover, these
measures effectively permit district courts to decide how insulated
their own decisions should be from appellate review. It is easy to see
why district courts might overuse that power.
Nonetheless, quick-pay provisions have several serious
limitations that make them an incomplete solution to the blackmail
threat. For example, even with quick-pay provisions, class counsel still
have an incentive to pay objectors to avoid the expense of litigating
the appeal. Moreover, when the amount of fees is large enough and
the probability of the appeal's success is greater than zero, risk
aversion might likewise lead class counsel to pay objectors despite
quick-pay provisions. In addition, quick-pay provisions do not prevent
objectors from blackmailing class action defendants in those cases in
which delaying the settlement may be costly to them. Finally, quickpay provisions do not prevent class action defendants from demanding
a premium from class counsel in exchange for their consent to such
provisions. Thus, although quick-pay provisions may reduce the "tax"

t1. This dataset is described in more detail in my forthcoming article, Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and their Fee Awards (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch.,
Conf. on Empirical Legal Stud., Working Paper 2009) (on file with author).

THE END OF OBJECTOR BLACKMAIL?

2009]

1627

that objectors can collect from class counsel, they cannot eliminate it
altogether.
There is, however, a complete solution to the blackmail
problem: an inalienability rule that prohibits objectors from selling
their right to appeal to class counsel or the defendant. That is, a
complete solution to the blackmail problem would prohibit objectors
from settling their appeals. Inalienability rules have been discussed in
the property scholarship for many decades as a way to deal with the
inefficiencies caused by holdouts and blackmail. 12 The virtue of such
rules is that parties no longer have an incentive to acquire a right for
the purpose of holding out or for blackmail if they cannot sell the
right. 13 That is, in the face of a rule that barred settling appeals, class
action objectors would not bother to appeal a settlement unless they
thought the appeal had some merit and were interested in seeing its
eventual resolution. Thus, not only should an inalienability rule
completely solve the blackmail problem, but because it does not chill
class members from taking legitimate appeals, it does not suffer the
drawbacks of either quick-pay provisions or the blackmail solutions
proposed by courts and commentators.
Inalienability rules usually come at the price of prohibiting
some efficient transactions from taking place. In the litigation context,
for example, it is often thought socially desirable that parties settle
even meritorious suits because they can save litigation costs. 14 Thus,
in the normal litigation context, prohibiting settlement of every case
would be a steep price to pay for the benefits of an inalienability rule.
In the context of class action settlements, however, it is usually not
socially desirable to settle nonfrivolous objections. These objections
inevitably affect more class members than those who brought the
objections; thus, permitting class counsel to buy off these objectors
prevents other class members from reaping the benefits of the
objection. This is why the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended in 2003 to prohibit class members from withdrawing their
12. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of
Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 55 (1999); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1001 (1972); Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE
L.J. 1163, 1201-02 (1999); Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403,
1441-47 (2009).
13. See Fennell, supra note 12, at 1412 (noting one reason for "blocking the A to B transfer
would be to alter the upstream course of events by influencing whether and how parties initially
acquire ...
14.

the entitlement").

See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 403 (2004)

("[A] mutually beneficial settlement exists as long as the plaintiffs estimate of the expected
judgment does not exceed the defendant's estimate by more than the sum of their costs of trial.").
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objections to class action settlements before the settlements were
approved by district courts. 15 In my view, a similar rule should be
adopted to prohibit settlement of objections once they have been
appealed.
In Part II of this Article, I describe the role of class action
objectors in the settlement process. Part III recounts the oft-expressed
concern by courts and commentators that class members are able to
blackmail class counsel into paying side settlements by filing frivolous
objections and appeals. In Part IV, I bring to light a practice that, as
far as I am aware, has never been discussed by courts or
commentators: quick-pay provisions. I argue that although the
provisions have many virtues, they also have many limitations. Part V
then compares quick-pay provisions to measures that have been
proposed by courts and commentators to mitigate objector blackmail:
ex post sanctions and large appellate bonds. I argue that, despite their
limitations, quick-pay provisions are superior to these other measures
because these other measures will inevitably chill legitimate
objections to class action settlements. Nonetheless, drawing on
property law scholarship, I contend that there is an even better
solution to the blackmail problem, one that neither suffers from the
limitations of quick-pay provisions nor the risk of chilling of legitimate
objections: an inalienability rule that prohibits objectors from settling
their appeals unless they made modifications to the underlying class
action agreement-modifications that would have to be approved by a
federal judge who could ensure that other class members were
enjoying the same benefits that the settling objector seeks to enjoy.
II. THE ROLE OF CLASS ACTION OBJECTORS AT SETTLEMENT
The vast majority of cases that are certified as class actions
and not dismissed on motions to dismiss or summary judgment are
terminated by settlement. 16 In federal court, which is the focus of this

15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5) ("Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires
court approval under this subdivision . . . the objection may be withdrawn only with the court's
approval."); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(B) 2003 advisory committee's note (revised and renumbered
as 23(e)(5)).
16. See, e.g., Emery Lee & Thomas E. Willing, Impact of the Class Action FairnessAct on
the Federal Courts: PreliminaryFindings from Phase Two's Pre-CAFA Sample of Diversity Class
Actions 11 (Federal Judicial Center 2008) ("Every case in which a motion to certify was granted,
unconditionally or for settlement purposes, resulted in a class settlement."); ROBERT H. KLONOFF
& EDWARD K.M. BILICH, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION: CASES AND

MATERIALS 362 (2002) (noting that only "a handful" of class actions under Rule 23 have ever
been tried to conclusion); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: D&O Insurance
and Securities Settlements 20, 755 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2009), available at http://papers.
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Article, 17 these settlements are negotiated by defendants and lawyers
appointed by district court judges to represent class members. Before
these settlements can take effect, they must also be approved by those
judges.18 In addition, because class counsel are appointed rather than
retained by class members themselves, 19 district court judges must set
the fees class action lawyers receive for their work. 20 Class action
lawyers are basically compensated on a contingency basis, and their
fees often come from the settlement they negotiated for the class
(usually as a percentage of the settlement), or, less commonly, from
the defendant pursuant to a fee-shifting statute (usually in the form of
a lodestar award). 2 1 In either case, federal district court judges have
22
considerable discretion to determine the fees of class action lawyers.

ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1101068# (noting that, with respect to securities fraud
class actions, "[t]rial ... is virtually unheard of').
17. I chose to focus on federal class action settlements both because most of the commentary
regarding objector blackmail has been in reference to federal settlements and because it is much
easier to gather data on federal litigation.
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) ('The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be
settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval.").
19. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(g)(1) ("Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a
class must appoint class counsel.").
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) ("In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees ....
").In securities fraud class actions filed after the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, some courts have begun to presume that the fees they award should be
based on the arrangement struck between class counsel and the lead (usually institutional)
plaintiff. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We therefore
believe that, under the PSLRA, courts should accord a presumption of reasonableness to any fee
request submitted pursuant to a retainer agreement that was entered into between a properlyselected lead plaintiff and a properly-selected lead counsel.").
21. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 31-32 (2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg &
Miller, An Empirical Study] (discussing the fee percentage and lodestar methods of awarding
attorneys' fees in the context of class action settlements).
22. The prevailing method for determining the appropriate fee to award class counsel from
a settlement they negotiated (i.e., so-called "common fund" cases) is to select a percentage of the
settlement based on a multi-factor test, see, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D.
207, 250 (D.N.J. 2005) (listing seven "standards" to use "[iun awarding attorneys' fees using the
percentage-of-recovery method in a common fund class action"), which, as with most multi-factor
tests, leaves courts with a great deal of discretion. Some courts of appeals have tried to confine
this discretion somewhat by adopting a presumption that 25 percent is an appropriate award in
common-fund cases. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 968 (9th Cir. 2003) ('This
circuit has established 25% of the common fund as a benchmark award for attorney fees.");
Camden I Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 1991) (establishing "bench
mark" percentage of 25 percent, "which may be adjusted up or down based on the circumstances
of each case"). In cases where fees are paid directly by defendants and in common-fund cases
where district courts do not use the percentage-of-the-settlement approach, district courts
reward class counsel using the fee "lodestar" enhanced by a discretionary multiplier. See
Eisenberg & Miller, An Empirical Study, supra note 21, at 31 ("Under the lodestar method ....
courts multiply the reasonable number of hours expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate
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There has long been concern that the interests of class counsel
diverge in several respects from the interests of class members, and,
accordingly, there has long been concern that any given class action
settlement might not be in the best interests of class members. 23 It is
for this reason, after all, that district court judges are required to
approve class action settlements. 24 It is also for this reason that class
members are given an opportunity to participate in the district court's
review of these settlements. 2 5 This opportunity is mandated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require that class members
receive notice of proposed settlements and attorney fee awards and
26
that class members have an opportunity to file objections thereto.
Indeed, in light of the fact that class counsel and defendants, by
definition, support class action settlements, it is especially important
that class members be given the opportunity to object to settlements;
without objectors there would be no adversarial testing of class action
27
settlements at all.
Nonetheless, class members do not take advantage of the
opportunity to object to settlements in great numbers. One empirical
study found that the median number of objections to a settlement was
and then adjust the product for various factors."). The discretionary multiplier gives district
courts considerable latitude to set fees even in these cases.
23. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 371-72 (2000) (acknowledging the
"standard depiction" of a class action attorney "as a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of
opportunistic actions and often willing to subordinate the interests of class members to the
attorney's own economic self-interest"); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation:Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
883-84 (1987) (stating that "[iut is no secret that substantial conflicts of interest between
attorney and client can arise in class action litigation" and then detailing some of the ways in
which these conflicts manifest themselves).
24. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in
Antitrust and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1065 (2002) ("Congress
required judicial approval of class action settlements precisely because the class counsel might
make agreements that maximize their personal gain at the expense of absent class members.").
25. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors
in Class Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (2004)
[hereinafter Eisenberg & Miller, The Role of Opt Outs] ("In theory, the right to object to a
settlement provides a check on reasonableness: the court can look to the views of class members
as a counterweight to the views of counsel and the representative parties, who may be biased in
favor of approval.").
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("The court must direct notice [of a proposed settlement] in a
reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal .... Any class
member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this subdivision (e) ....
");
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(h) ("Notice of the motion [for an award of attorneys' fees] must be served on all
parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a reasonable manner. A
class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion.").
27. See Brunet, supra note 1, at 439-43 (noting that many courts have commented on the
important role objectors can play in class action settlements).
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three-well less than one-tenth of one percent of class members. 28 The
small number of objections is usually attributed to the fact that class
members often have little at stake individually in a settlement,
making it economically irrational for many of them to go through the
trouble of filing objections. 29 When they do file objections, the
objections can be as informal as a few comments scrawled on a piece of
loose-leaf paper 30 or as formal as filings by lawyers representing one
or more class members, accompanied by expert testimony and motions
to intervene and to take discovery. 3 1 In theory, district courts review
these objections, along with arguments supporting the settlement
from class counsel and defendants, when deciding whether
settlements and the fees sought by class counsel are in the best
interests of the class. 32 It is rare, however, for district courts to reject
proposed class action settlements on the basis of objections; 33 only
somewhat more frequently do district courts award fees less lucrative
34
than those sought by class counsel.

28. Eisenberg & Miller, The Role of Opt Outs, supra note 25, at 1546 (reviewing 236 state
and federal class action settlements).
29. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems
and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2007) ("For individual class members,
objecting does not appear to be cost-beneficial. Objecting entails costs, and the stakes for
individual class members are often low."); id. at 91 (noting that "even those class members who
believe that the proposed settlement is inadequate may remain silent because they (correctly)
calculate that the costs of objecting exceed the expected benefits of doing so").
30. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 520 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278
(D. Mass. 2007) (describing "one-sentence" objection); Brief for Respondents at 31, Devlin v.
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-417) (citing examples of objectors who "file a piece of paper
containing some variant of 'I object' or 'This is a terrible deal' ").
31. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.643 (2004) (providing a summary
of the rights of an objector in a class action to seek discovery, introduce expert testimony, and file
motions (including motions to intervene) as part of the objection).
32. See id. at § 21.641 ("In evaluating the settlement, the court should take into account not
only the presentations of counsel, but also information from other sources, such as
presentations by objections .... ").
33. See Leslie, supra note 29, at 114 ("[Clourts rarely reject proposed settlements in
response to objections."); Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper & Robert J. Niemec, An
Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 14041 (1996) (reporting that, out of all class actions filed in four federal district courts over a twoyear period, "about half of the settlements that were the subject of a [settlement approval]
hearing generated at least one objection" and that "[a]pproximately 90% or more of the proposed
settlements were approved without changes in each of the four districts").
34. See Michael A. Perino, The Milberg Weiss Prosecution:No Harm, No Foul? 1, 59 (St.
John's Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-0135, 2008), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=l133995 ("In more than half the cases [out of 687 studied], judges award plaintiffs'
attorneys precisely the fee they requested. When judges do award less than what was requested,
those downward departures tend to be quite small. On average, judges awarded plaintiffs'
attorneys 90% of the fees they requested.").

1632

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:6:1623

Once the district court has rejected class members' objections
and approved the settlement, the question becomes who, if anyone,
may appeal the district court's judgment. It is around this question
that the threat posed by objector blackmail has coalesced. Before the
Supreme Court's 2002 opinion in Devlin v. Scardelletti,35 there were
two schools of thought on this question. The first school, adopted by a
number of courts of appeals, was that only the formal parties to the
36
class action litigation could appeal the approval of the settlement.
The formal parties included the defendant, the class members named
as the representative plaintiffs, class counsel (who can appeal matters
concerning their fee awards), and any class members who successfully
moved for intervention under Federal Rule 24. 37 As noted above, given
that the defendant, the representative plaintiffs, and class counsel
almost always support the class action settlement (lest there be no
settlement),3 8 the formal view typically meant only class members who
went through the trouble of intervention could appeal. This was an
exceedingly small group. 39 The second school of thought (which might
be called the "informal" one), also adopted by a number of courts of
appeals, was that any class member who filed an objection to the
settlement-whether they formally intervened or not-could also take
an appeal from the approval of the settlement. 40 The second school, of
course, opened appeals up to a much bigger group of class members.
In Devlin, the Supreme Court was asked to decide which school
of thought was the correct one, and the Court sided with the informal

35. 536 U.S. 1 (2002).
36. See Scardelletti v. Debarr, 265 F.3d 195, 208-10 (4th Cir. 2001); Cook v. Powell Buick,
Inc., 155 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1998); Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873, 874 (7th Cir. 1998);
Shults v. Champion Int'l Corp., 35 F.3d 1056, 1061 (6th Cir. 1994); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d
1004, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 1993); Croyden Assocs. v. Alleco, Inc., 969 F.2d 675, 678-80 (8th Cir.
1992); Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628-29 (11th Cir. 1987).
37. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the 'parties' to a
judgment are those named as such - whether as the original plaintiff or defendant in the
complaint giving rise to the judgment, or as 'one who [though] not an original party ... becomes
a party by intervention ... '" and "the class representatives").
38. This, of course, is not true with respect to the fee award, which class counsel will
sometimes appeal. Moreover, on rare occasions, the representative plaintiffs will oppose the
settlement negotiated on their behalf. See, e.g., Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 583 (3d
Cir. 1999).
39. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Evans, 815 F.2d 626, 628-29 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that "nonnamed[ ] class members do not have standing to appeal" if they do not intervene).
40. See In re PaineWebber Inc. Ltd. P'ships Litig., 94 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1996); Carlough v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 5 F.3d 707, 710 (3d Cir. 1993); Marshall v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 550 F.2d
1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1977).
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view. 41 Although the Court acknowledged that, typically, only
"parties" to the final judgment could take appeals, and that class
members other than the representative plaintiffs were not usually
considered "parties" to class action judgments, it nonetheless
concluded that class members who filed objections should be
42
considered "parties" solely for the purposes of appealing settlements.
Thus, since 2002, any class action objector-no matter how informal
the objection-has been able to appeal from the approval of a class
action settlement or the attorneys' fees awarded by the district court
pursuant to that settlement. 43 Although the Devlin rule made it easier
for class members to appeal settlements, it also made it easier for
class members to engage in what many courts and commentators refer
to as objector "blackmail." 44 Indeed, both the litigants 4 and Justice
Scalia's dissent 46 in Devlin warned that the Court's decision would
lead to such a phenomenon.

III.

THE CONCERNS OVER OBJECTOR "BLACKMAIL"

This concern over objector "blackmail" is a specific application
of the more general concern with rent-seeking by "holdouts. ''47 When
41. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 14 (holding that "nonnamed class members . . . who have
objected in a timely manner to approval of the settlement at the fairness hearing have the power
to bring an appeal without first intervening").
42. See id. at 7-9 (acknowledging that "only parties to a lawsuit... may appeal an adverse
judgment" (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)) but explaining that an objector "will
only be allowed to appeal that aspect of the District Court's order that affects him-the District
Court's decision to disregard his objections").
43. Although Devlin was technically a case involving an appeal only from a settlement and
not an award of attorneys' fees, its holding has been extended to appeals from fee awards. See,
e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 325 F.3d 974, 976-77 (7th Cir. 2003).
44. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 1, at 429 (arguing that "Devlin may have raised the ante
for class action objectors by legitimizing their efforts to appeal from district court approvals of
settlements").
45. See Brief for Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 18, Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (No. 01-417) (arguing that, if permitted to appeal
settlements, objectors may "attempt to take personal advantage" of the "delay" caused by the
appeal, and thereby create "great pressure" to "pay substantial amounts of 'ransom' to such
objectors"); Brief for Respondents at 31, Devlin, 536 U.S. 1 (arguing that if objectors are
permitted to appeal a settlement some class members will attempt "to simply extract a fee by
lodging generic, unhelpful protests" (quoting Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d
942, 973 (E.D. Tex. 2000))).
46. See Devlin, 536 U.S. at 22 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (warning of " 'canned' objections
filed by professional objectors who seek out class actions to simply extract a fee by lodging
generic, unhelpful protests" (quoting Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74 & n. 18)).
47. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 124-25 (noting the problem as a justification for
eminent domain: "In the building of a road, for example, the ability of essentially any individual
on its planned path to prevent the project from going forward could cause serious bargaining
problems for a government agency that must acquire land through purchases").
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class members object to settlements and file appeals therefrom, they
can prevent the settlements from becoming final for other class
members and for class counsel. If their objections have merit, appeals
by objectors can lead courts of appeals to reverse the approvals of
settlements and fee awards. But even if their objections do not have
merit, appeals by objectors can disrupt settlements by requiring class
counsel to expend resources fighting appeals, and, more importantly,
by delaying the point at which settlements become final. It can take
"months or even years" for courts of appeals to rule on civil appeals, 48
and this delay in finalizing settlements can also delay when class
counsel receive their fee awards (which are almost always contingent
on the settlements). 49 With attorneys' fees in class actions now
running as high as hundreds of millions of dollars in a single
settlement, 50 it can be very expensive indeed for class counsel to wait
an extra one or two years to receive their fee awards.
It should therefore come as no surprise that class counsel are
willing to dip into their own pockets to pay objectors to drop their
appeals. As one commentator has noted, "The very threat of an appeal
can give... objectors a major weapon. They now possess substantial
leverage when negotiating with the counsel seeking to secure an
approved settlement." 51 Delay is not, of course, the only reason class
counsel might be willing to settle an appeal brought by an objector;
they also settle such appeals in order to avoid adverse results and to

48.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 3.08 cmt. b ("A

baseless objection, followed by an appeal after the objection is rejected, can delay the finalization
of a settlement for months or even years."); Brunet, supra note 1, at 429 ("The ability to appeal
after filing an objection in the district court-now firmly established after Devlin-slows down
the class action's progress considerably.").
49.

See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 3.08 cmt. a

(noting that objectors who appeal class action settlements "delay[] distributions to . . . class
counsel"); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 120 n.64 (1997) (explaining that objectors "can appeal the settlement ...
and during the appeal process, the settlement will be in limbo. Class counsel will not be paid and
class members will not receive their benefits. The prospect of delaying a settlement for months or
years by taking an appeal is the realistic threat that objectors hold over the heads of the settling
parties."); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2006) (noting that objectors can "forc[e] the class
attorneys to pay them to go away lest the class attorneys' own fee be held up through appeals").
50. See, e.g., Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1239-43 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (awarding $333,719,569); In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. and "ERISA" Litig., No.
02-5575, 2006 WL 3057232, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (awarding $147,500,000); In re Royal
Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 461 F. Supp. 2d 383, 387 (D. Md. 2006) (awarding
$130,647,868); Spartanburg Reg'l Health Servs. Dist., Inc. v. Hillenbrand Indus., Inc., No. 032141, slip op. at 11 (D.S.C. Aug. 15, 2006) (awarding $117,157,800).
51. Brunet, supra note 1, at 429.
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avoid litigation expenses.5 2 The "blackmail" concern has arisen from
the premiums class counsel are willing to pay objectors beyond the
expected value of their appeals-i.e., premiums to avoid delay, and, to
a lesser extent, to save litigation expenses and avoid risk. 53 These
premiums have encouraged class members to file objections without
54
any merit simply to collect side settlements from class counsel.
Courts and commentators characterize the "blackmail" problem as one
that arises when class counsel pay a premium to objectors whose
appeals have no merit in order to avoid the delays and other
complications those appeals will cause in the disbursement of their fee
awards. 55
It should be noted that class counsel may not be entirely
uncompensated for the delays caused by appeals. Sometimes
settlement agreements provide that class counsel can earn interest on
their fee awards while any appeal is pending; it is not uncommon for
the agreement to require defendants to place the corpus of the
settlement and attorneys' fees in an escrow account so that it earns
interest for both class members and class counsel. 56 Nonetheless, class
57
action settlements do not always provide for interest pending appeal.
Even when they do, the rate of interest in an escrow account is often
not very lucrative; class counsel can often generate a better return on
their money, whether by investing it in another class action case or
somewhere else. Thus, one way to understand the blackmail
phenomenon is as a willingness on the part of class counsel to settle
meritless appeals out of their own pocket in order, among other
things, to receive their fees and put them to higher uses during the
"months or years" they would otherwise wait for the appeals to be
resolved.

52. See SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 403 (setting forth the conventional settlement theory that
litigants decide to settle litigation based on their "estimate[s] of the expected judgment" and
their costs of litigating).
53. See supra notes 48-49.
54. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 3.08 cmt. a
(noting that class members file objections that are "insubstantial" or "not objectively reasonable"
in order to extract a "side deal").
55. See supra notes 48-49 and infra notes 57-67.
56. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 8, New England Health Care Employees Pension
Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 627 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (No. 98-99) ("The [Settlement
Fund] shall be transferred by the Defendants' insurers ... to the Escrow Agent within ten (10)
days following the entry by the Court of an Order ...preliminarily approving this settlement ...
.11).

57. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting
that the settlement agreement in that case "ma[de] no provision for the payment of pre-judgment
interest.., and [did] not become effective .. . until the appeals [were] concluded").
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As such, objector blackmail is often seen as something of a
"tax" on the settlement of class action litigation. As one district court
recently put it:
[O]bjectors to class action settlements can make a living simply by filing frivolous
appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of settlements. The larger the
settlement, the more cost-effective it is to pay the objectors rather than suffer the delay
of waiting for an appeal to be resolved (even an expedited appeal). Because of these
economic realities, professional objectors can levy what is effectively a tax on class
action settlements, a tax that has no benefit to anyone other than to the objectors.
Literally nothing is gained from the cost: Settlements are not restructured and the class,
on whose behalf the appeal is purportedly raised, gains nothing.58

Many courts and commentators believe objector blackmail is a
serious problem. District court judges routinely complain of objectors
"who seek out class actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic,
unhelpful protests ' 59 and who "maraud proposed settlements-not to
assess their merits-but in order to extort the parties ... into
ransoming a settlement that could otherwise be undermined by a
time-consuming appeals process. ' 60 Courts of appeals likewise warn
that "objectors may use an appeal as a means of leveraging
compensation for themselves or their counsel" 61 and refer to objector
'62
appeals as "extortive legal proceedings.
Commentators, too, have expressed these concerns. A good
source for the conventional scholarly wisdom on class action objectors
is the current draft of the American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation, which is authored by some of the most
prominent class action scholars in America. 63 According to the authors
58. Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3-4
(D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006).
59. Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973-74 & n.18 (E.D. Tex.
2000).
60. Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., No. 97-2784, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 8,
2000); see also, e.g., Varacallo v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 226 F.R.D. 207, 240 (D.N.J. 2005)
(noting that '"[flederal courts are increasingly weary of professional objectors"' (quoting O'Keefe
v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2003))); In re Holocaust Victim
Assets Litig., 311 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (characterizing notice of appeal as "an
unsuccessful attempt to extort a significant cash award from the settlement fund"); In re
Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 218 n.52 (D. Me. 2003)
(complaining of "professional objectors" in class action litigation); O'Keefe, 214 F.R.D. at 295 n.26
(noting that "some of the objections were obviously canned objections filed by professional
objectors who seek out class actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful
protests" (quoting Shaw, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 973)).
61. Vaughn, 507 F.3d at 300.
62. Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999); see also, e.g.,
Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 2001) (characterizing appeal
by ol1jectors as one "solely to enable themselves to receive a fee").
63. The reporters of the A.L.I. project are Professors Samuel Issacharoff, Robert H. Klonoff,
Richard A. Nagareda, and Charles Silver.
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of the A.L.I. project, class action objectors often "threate[n] to...
appeala the settlement[s] on insubstantial grounds, thereby delaying
distributions to ... class counsel," which "often place[s] class counsel
in a compromised position in which the failure to pay off objectors
could delay ...
settlement. ."..", 4 Other commentators concur,
asserting that "[o]bjectors can bring strike-suit-like objections, forcing
the class attorneys to pay them to go away lest the class attorneys'
own fees be held up through appeals" 65 and that objectors often "just
want to hold up the settlement to extract a commission."6 6 Like judges,
commentators are not afraid to refer to this practice as "blackmail"
67
and "extortion."
What kind of class members would be savvy enough to take
advantage of these holdout opportunities? It is thought that, like class
actions themselves, objector blackmail is usually lawyer driven. For
example, many courts and commentators worry about "professional
objectors" who travel from settlement to settlement looking for class
members on whose behalf they can make objections. 68 Others worry

64. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supranote 3, § 3.08 cmt. a.
65. Rubenstein, supra note 49, at 1449.
66. Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
633, 635 (2003); see also Richard A. Nagareda, AdministeringAdequacy in Class Representation,
82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 375 (2003) (noting "the current phenomenon of 'professional objectors'-a
term used colloquially to describe plaintiffs' law firms that threaten objections largely as a
means to obtain side payments for themselves in exchange for their agreement either to drop the
objections or not to raise them in the first place").
67. Brunet, supra note 1, at 409, 426, 429; see also, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 21.643 (2004) ("Some objections... are made for improper purposes, and benefit only
the objectors and their attorneys (e.g., by seeking additional compensation to withdraw even illfounded objections)."); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers
Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 155 (2001) ("[Olbjectors ... are often motivated
not by the chance to protect the class from a sellout settlement but by the prospect of being paid
off by class counsel and/or the defendant to drop their objections and walk away."); Leslie, supra
note 29, at 129 n.353 (noting that "[iut is ... possible that a class member objects to a proposed
settlement ... because she is trying to extort a more profitable side deal from the defendants");
Miller & Singer, supra note 49, at 120 (noting that "objectors have become a major force in class
action settlements, . . . in part because [they] sometimes earn a great deal of money by
intervening"); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 571, 618 (1997) (explaining that, "[b]y filing or threatening to file an objection to the
settlement, a class member may be able to 'extort' a settlement that represents a
disproportionate amount of the settlement fund"); Richard B. Schmitt, Objecting to Class Action
Pacts Can Be Lucrativefor Attorneys, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 1997, at B1 (describing the practice of
objecting to class action settlements in order to extract a sizeable fee from class counsel).
68. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 1, at 437 n.150 (describing "professional objectors" as
"attorneys in private practice who have a specialty in filing objections in class action cases,
usually after a proposed settlement has emerged, and always to collect a fee"). It may be easier
for professional objectors to operate in securities fraud class actions because they can team up for
this purpose with individuals or entities that buy small numbers of shares of stock in a number
of publicly traded companies.
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about lawyers who object to settlements as part of a rivalry between
firms to control class action suits. For example, lawyers representing
class members in competing actions might use objections to force class
counsel in the settling cases to share fee awards with them. 69 This is
just one of many different ways firms compete with one another over
70
class action largesse.
To believe that class action objectors have the power to
blackmail class counsel is not, of course, to say that all objections are
an attempt to do so. Courts and commentators note that objectors can
serve a very positive role in class action settlements by bringing
attention to flaws in those settlements. 71 Indeed, given that class
counsel and defendants by definition support class action settlements,
objectors typically provide the only adversarial testing of class action
settlements.72
But there are blackmail-minded objectors, too, and courts and
commentators have proposed countermeasures to the blackmail
threat. Commentators, for example, have proposed punishing with
sanctions class members who make objections that are later deemed
by district courts to have been insubstantial. 73 A more draconian
proposal developed by district courts is to require class action
objectors who wish to appeal settlements or attorneys' fees to post
large bonds under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
As I explain in more detail in Part IV, although Rule 7 has been
thought to permit courts to require security for only the most
mundane expenses (such as photocopying and binding appellate
briefs), courts have begun to include many other expenses when it
comes to class action objectors. 74 These expenses include things like
the attorneys' fees class counsel and defendants project they will incur
on appeal as well as expenses associated with the delay in

69. See, e.g., Brian Anderson, Remarks from Panel 2: Tools for Ensuring that Settlements
Are "Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate," at the FTC Workshop on Protecting Consumer Interests
in Class Actions (Sept. 13, 2004), in 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1197, 1204 (2005) (noting that, "as
is often the case when we have multiple class actions filed around the country on the same
issue," class counsel can be blackmailed by "lawyers who are prosecuting other lawsuits and ...
have been left out of the settlement tent, often because their fee demands were exorbitant").
70. See Nagareda, supra note 66, at 342-47.
71. See Brunet, supra note 1, at 439-43 (noting that many courts have commented on the
important role objectors can play in class action settlements).
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 3, § 3.08(d) &
cmt. a ("If the court concludes that objectors have lodged objections that are insubstantial and
not reasonably advanced for the purpose of rejecting or improving the settlement, the court
should consider imposing sanctions against objectors or their counsel ... .
74. See infra text accompanying notes 111-19.
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administering the settlement fund.7 5 Courts can require these bonds
regardless of whether or not the district court believes the appeal is
frivolous, and some of these bonds have totaled hundreds of thousands
or even millions of dollars. 76 It goes without saying that few objectors
are in a position to pay such amounts, and if this practice becomes
pervasive, it may have the effect of undoing Devlin altogether.
Despite the concern paid to objector blackmail by courts and
commentators, the pervasiveness of this practice has never been clear.
Although class counsel often settle appeals filed by objectors 77 (and
sometimes for very significant amounts of money78 ), it has never been
clear how often objectors file appeals and how many of them might be
of the "blackmail" variety.7 9 In order to assess how pervasive objector
blackmail is, I consulted an original dataset I created consisting of the
304 class action cases that settled in federal district court during
2006.80 Although it would be difficult to examine the merits of each of
these cases and make a determination of how often class members
75. See id.
76. See infra note 120.
77. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Must the Interests of the Client Always Come First?, 53 ME.
L. REV. 471, 479 (2001) (noting that class counsel "believe it is proper to buy off these objectors
because they think the settlement is a good settlement, and the class is going to get the money
sooner that way").
78. See, e.g., Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999)
(noting that objectors settled their appeal on "very, very good" terms); Brunet, supra note 1, at
429-30 (noting that "[t]he size of these fees [extracted by objectors] can be considerable" and
discussing one million dollar fee extracted by objectors in class action suit against LouisianaPacific).
79. Professor Brunet seems to believe the number is small, see Brunet, supra note 1, at 437
("[T]he quantum of attorney-led free-riding objection activity ... is probably a low percentage of
all class action objections."), but he notes that others believe differently, see id. at 437 & nn.15153; see also 5 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:37 (4th ed.

2002) ("[O]bjections in 'boilerplate' form filed by 'professional objectors' often delay and
unnecessarily complicate class proceedings by requiring court review of purported issues with no
colorable merit.").
80. This dataset is described in more detail in a forthcoming article, An Empirical Study of
Class Action Settlements and their Fee Awards. Fitzpatrick, supra note 11. The dataset includes
all class actions settled in 2006, as measured by the date of the district court's written order
granting final approval of the settlement. As there is no single repository of all federal class
action settlements, I consulted a variety of sources to identify these settlements. For securities
fraud cases, there is a list of settlements generally regarded as comprehensive maintained by
Risk Metrics, a for-profit organization that assists institutional investors in making claims in
such settlements. In order to obtain a list of non-securities cases and to catch any securities cases
that might have been missed by RiskMetrics, I supplemented its list with several broad Westlaw
searches, three reporters of class action settlements-BNA Class Action Litigation Report,
Mealey's Jury Verdicts and Settlements, and Mealey's Litigation Report-and a web site that
maintains an impressive collection of class action settlements, Class Action World. I also
obtained a list from the Administrative Office of Courts of all district court cases coded as class
actions that terminated by settlement in 2006. To my knowledge, this dataset is the most
comprehensive set ever compiled of federal class action settlements in any given year.
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took meritorious versus blackmail-minded appeals from these
settlements, it is possible to determine how often class members took
any appeal at all. This information is available in the docket entries
made in PACER for each of the cases that settled. Because objector
blackmail cannot occur without an appeal,8 1 the total number of
appeals can be used to establish an upper bound on how often
blackmail might be occurring. As Table 1 shows, fewer than 10
82
percent of all settlements saw any appeal brought by class members.
TABLE 1. APPEALS TAKEN BY CLASS MEMBERS FROM FEDERAL

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS IN 2006
Settlements

Appeals filed

304

41
(0.13/settlement)

Settlements with at least
one appeal
27 (8.9%)

The percentage of cases in which objectors tried to blackmail class
counsel was therefore only some fraction of 10 percent. These numbers
raise the question whether objector blackmail is as serious a problem
as courts and commentators have long thought it has been. On the
other hand, perhaps blackmail-minded objectors have been deterred
from filing appeals in recent years in light of the aforementioned
countermeasures. Or perhaps they have been deterred for the reasons
set forth in the next Part.
IV. THE HIDDEN RESPONSE TO BLACKMAIL: QUICK-PAY PROVISIONS
The countermeasures to objector blackmail developed by courts
and commentators overlook an important development in class action
litigation. This development is known among class action lawyers as
the "quick pay" provision. In this Part, I first explain how quick-pay

81. Prior to 2003, objector blackmail may have occurred even before the appellate stage
because class counsel could pay class members to withdraw their objections from the district
court. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 1, at 426-27 & n.98; Woolley, supra note 67, at 618. Although
class counsel can technically still do so, in order to discourage such side settlements, the Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended in 2003 to require disclosure of these payments to the court. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(B) 2003 advisory committee's note (revised and
renumbered as 23(e)(5)). Although it is theoretically possible that class counsel could pay off
class members even before they file their objections with the district court, this strikes me as
somewhat implausible.
82. Besides class members, settlements were occasionally appealed by class counsel
unhappy with the fees awarded by the district court and by non-settling defendants concerned
about the effect the settlement with the other defendants would have on their cases.
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provisions work to mitigate objector blackmail and then consult my
dataset to show how prevalent these provisions have already become.
Because these provisions are in such wide use but apparently are
unknown to courts and commentators, it is worth evaluating whether
the provisions are as good for class members as they are for class
action lawyers. Although I conclude that quick-pay provisions are a
benign effort to solve the blackmail problem, I argue that the
provisions are not a panacea; they suffer from several significant
limitations that undermine their effectiveness.
A. What Are Quick-Pay Provisions?
The quick-pay provision is special wording inserted by class
counsel, with the consent of the defendants, into class action
settlement agreements. These provisions permit class counsel to
receive the fees awarded to them by district courts as soon as those
courts approve the class action settlements, regardless of whether the
settlements or fees are appealed. These provisions deal with the
possibility of appeals by obligating class counsel to repay the fees if
the settlements or their fees are later overturned or modified. An
example of one of these provisions is the following:
Attorneys' fees and expenses awarded by the Court shall be payable from the Settlement
Fund upon award, notwithstanding the existence of any timely filed objections thereto,
or potential for appeal therefrom, or collateral attack on the Settlement or any part
thereof, subject to Lead Plaintiffs' Lead Counsel's obligation to make appropriate
refunds or repayments to the Settlement Fund plus accrued interest at the same net
rate as is earned by the Settlement Fund, if and when, as a result of any appeal and/or
further proceedings on remand, or successful collateral attack, the fee or cost award is
83
reduced or reversed.

The purpose of quick-pay provisions is to greatly reduce the
leverage objecting class members have over class counsel by removing
the ability of their appeals to delay the point at which class counsel
receive fee awards. If class counsel have already received their fee
awards, then there is no reason for them to pay a premium to
objectors with meritless appeals merely to avoid the delay caused by
their appeals. In this regard, quick-pay provisions may discourage
objectors from filing meritless appeals in the first place because the
provisions increase the ability of class counsel to credibly threaten to
ride an appeal out to fruition. Of course, counsel may still be willing to
pay objectors with meritless appeals a relatively small sum to avoid

83. Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release of Sec. Action, at
22-23, In re Aspen Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 04-12375 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2006).
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the expense of defending against the appeal.8 4 Moreover, if the appeals
have some merit, then class counsel will still be willing to pay
objectors in proportion to the probability of an adverse result 5 and if
86
the fee award is large enough and firm capitalization small enough,
they may even be willing to pay a premium over the expected value of
the appeal on account of risk aversion.8 7 I discuss these limitations on
the effectiveness of quick-pay provisions in greater detail later in this
Part.8 8 Nonetheless, quick-pay provisions certainly have the potential
89
to reduce the holdout tax considerably.
B. How PrevalentAre Quick-Pay Provisions?
In order to assess how ubiquitous quick-pay provisions have
already become, I again consulted my dataset of all class action cases
settled in federal district court during 2006. I sought the settlement
agreements 90 approved by the district court for each of the 304
84. See SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 403 (setting forth the conventional settlement theory that
litigants decide to settle litigation based on their "estimate[s] of the expected judgment" and
their costs of litigating) (emphasis omitted).
85. See id.
86. Although some class action firms are very well capitalized, not all of them are. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Asbestos and the Limits of Litigation, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (2003)
(noting that "at the end of the twentieth century," the plaintiffs' bar "had the intellectual and
financial capital to inflict bankruptcy or a near-equivalent on a major industry"); Stephen
Yeazell, Re-financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183, 210-11 (2001) (noting that the
"securities bar ... is an outlier ... in terms of .... financial capital" because it has "sufficiently
deep capital to withstand the expectable procedural motions and the duration of discovery,
including the ability to finance credible experts, and the financial and transactional
sophistication to create elaborate settlements").
87. See SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 406 ("When we introduce risk aversion into the basic
model, we see that it leads to a greater likelihood of settlement.").
88. Interestingly, there is a similar practice in eminent domain proceedings known as
"quick take," which permits governments to take property before the condemnation litigation has
concluded. See, e.g., Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C.A. § 3114(a); 6 JULIUS L. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN
24.10[2] (2008). Quick-take laws serve a similar purpose as
quick-pay provisions: preventing holdouts from using delay to extract premiums above the fair
market value of their property. See, e.g., MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE Art. VI, Refs & Annos,
prefatory cmt. (1) (2002).
89. One might argue that quick-pay provisions may not reduce the blackmail threat
because, even with these provisions, class counsel will still desire to buy off meritless objector
appeals in order to accelerate the final resolution of the settlement for the benefit of class
members. Given, however, that blackmail bounties come from the pockets of class counsel and
not from those of class members, one making this argument would have to believe that class
action lawyers are willing to impoverish themselves in order to enrich their clients. Many
commentators believe that this is a naively magnanimous view of class action lawyers. See supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
90. The relevant language indicating when class counsel received their fees was almost
always found only in the settlement agreements themselves; only occasionally was it found in the
court orders.
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settlements on PACER, from class counsel who negotiated the
settlements, and, as a last resort, from the district courts themselves.
Four settlements occurred in cases brought by firms or public interest
groups that did not seek fee awards, and I was unable to obtain the
settlement agreements in four other cases. For the remaining 296
settlements in which I could obtain the settlement agreements and in
which counsel sought fees, Table 2 reports the ubiquity of quick-pay
provisions.
TABLE 2. NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENT PAYMENT
PROVISIONS IN FEDERAL CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS IN 2006

Type of Provision
Traditional
Quick Pay
None
Other

Number
111
10591
52
28

Frequency
37.50%
35.47%
17.57%
9.46%

The quick-pay provision appeared in over one-third of all class
action settlement agreements, most of them following the same
boilerplate found in the agreement quoted above. 92 Quick-pay
provisions were only slightly less common than the provision setting
forth the traditional practice for the payment of lawyers who, like
class counsel, work on contingency: class counsel received their fees
only once all possible appeals were exhausted. I call these provisions
"traditional" in Table 2, and they usually read something like the
following:
Such attorneys' fees, expenses and costs as are awarded by the Court shall be paid from
the Settlement Fund pursuant to the direction of Lead Counsel, but payment shall not
be made before ... the occurrence of the later of: (a) if there are no appeals, then the
expiration of the time for the filing or noticing of any appeals from the Order of Final
Judgment and Dismissal; or (b) if there is an appeal, the date on which the Order of
Final Judgment and Dismissal which has not been materially altered, amended or
modified in any respect by any Court without express consent by all parties, is no longer
subject to any further judicial review or appeal whatsoever, whether by reason of

91. In some of these settlements, the quick-pay terms did not execute automatically but
were left to the option of the class action defendants once the settlement was approved. See
Settlement Agreement at 4, 32-33, Smith v. Flanagan, No. 03-2895 (D. Md. Feb. 17, 2006);
Stipulation of Settlement with Ernest & Young LLP at 16-17, 19-20, In re Cendant Corp. Litig.,
No. 98-1664 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2000).
92 On occasion, courts will postpone the award of all or (more commonly) a portion of
attorneys' fees until the settlement proceeds have actually been distributed to class members (a
process that can take several months or years). It is unclear how quick-pay provisions would
interact with postponed fees; presumably, quick-pay provisions would apply only to the portion of
fees that is not postponed by the court.
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affirmance by a court of last resort, lapse of time, voluntary dismissal of the appeal or
otherwise. For purposes of this Paragraph, an "appeal" shall include any request for
reargument or reconsideration, a petition for a writ of certiorari or other writ that may
93
be filed in connection with approval or disapproval of this Settlement.

In most of the remaining settlements (almost one-fifth of the
total), the agreements said nothing at all about when class counsel
would receive their fees. It is unclear when class counsel would have
received their fees in these settlements, although, in light of the
traditional practice, class counsel probably received their fees in these
cases only once any appeals to the settlements or fees had been
exhausted. In the rest of the settlements (less than one-tenth of the
total), the agreements said something more complicated than the
foregoing, and I have labeled these agreements as "other" in Table 2.
Although it is somewhat unclear when class counsel would have
received their fees in these cases, it appears that in many instances
savvy class members would have been able to structure their
objections in a way to delay the receipt of fee awards until appeals
94
from those objections had been resolved.

93. Amended Stipulation of Settlement at 8-9, 22-23, In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 035336 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2006).
94. In fifteen settlements, the agreements set forth the traditional practice that class
counsel were to receive their fees only once the settlement became "final" and all appeals were
exhausted, but the agreements went on to define "final" in a way that seemed to exclude appeals
that challenged only the fees awarded to class counsel. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement of
Securities Action at 7, 18, Ohio Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Freddie Mac, MDL No.
1584 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2006) ("Any attorneys' fees and expenses awarded by the Court... shall
be paid ... to Lead Counsel... within three (3) days after the Judgment becomes Final .... Any
appeal or proceeding seeking subsequent judicial review pertaining solely to the Court's approval
of ... the award of attorney's fees or expenses shall not affect the time set forth above for the
Judgment to become Final."). In four agreements, class counsel were permitted to receive early
any portion of their fee awards that were not challenged on appeal. See, e.g., Stipulation of
Settlement at 6-7, 18-21, Levitan v. McCoy, No. 00-C-5096 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2006) ("If a Class
Member or other Person appeals the Fee Award, payment of any uncontested amount shall not
be stayed, but instead shall be paid as provided herein as if no appeal had been taken. The
contested amount shall remain in the Settlement Fund, but shall not be paid to anyone until and
unless a final order is issued by the Court in relation to any contest. To the extent such appeal is
unsuccessful, any attorney's fees, costs or expenses found to have been properly awarded but not
yet paid shall immediately be paid, but not before the Effective Date."). In these nineteen
settlements, it seems fairly clear that class members could structure their objections in a way to
delay the distribution of fees to class counsel.
This is less clear in the remaining nine settlements. The agreements in these settlements set
forth a date certain on which class counsel would receive their fees and did not address what
might happen to that date if appeals were filed. See, e.g., Stipulation and Agreement of
Settlement at 14-15, Hanley v. Warburg Pincus Capital Co., L.P., No. 96-390 (D. Ariz. Apr. 24,
2006) ("Attorneys' fees ... shall . . . be advanced by the Settling Defendants to Plaintiffs Lead
Counsel within ten (10) days of Court approval of the Settlement and the award of counsel fees
and expenses .... ). It is not clear whether class members could have delayed the distribution of
fee awards to class counsel in these nine settlements.
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Thus, although quick-pay provisions were not included in the
majority of class action settlements, they were nonetheless well
represented. They were even better represented, however, in
securities fraud class actions, appearing in nearly 80 percent of these
settlement agreements. Indeed, as Table 3 shows, quick-pay
provisions are the near-exclusive province of securities fraud class
actions: although four-fifths of securities fraud settlements included
quick-pay provisions, only one-twentieth of non-securities class action
settlements did so.
TABLE 3. FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENT PAYMENT PROVISIONS BY TYPE OF
CASE IN FEDERAL CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS IN 2006

Type of Provision
Quick Pay
Traditional
None
Other

Securities Cases
(n=118)
79.66%
11.02%
4.24%
5.08%

Non-Securities Cases
(n=178)
6.18%
55.06%
26.40%
12.36%

The fact that class counsel do not use quick-pay provisions
more often in non-securities cases is interesting. Although objector
blackmail may be less of a problem in such cases (perhaps because
95
professional objectors find it more difficult to operate there ), it is still
hard to see why class counsel would not use the provisions. From their
perspective, these provisions would seem to have little downside
(receiving fees earlier would always seem preferable to later), and as
far as I am aware, courts have never discouraged (or even scrutinized)
the provisions.
A few possible hypotheses may explain this dramatic divide
between securities and non-securities cases. One hypothesis is that
quick-pay provisions were invented by securities class action
lawyers-perhaps, again, because objector blackmail was more
prevalent in the securities area given the relative ease with which
professional objectors can operate there-and that knowledge of these
provisions simply has not spread to the class action lawyers who bring
non-securities cases. Another hypothesis is that defendants are less
inclined to go along with these provisions in non-securities cases than
in securities cases. Although defendants are often indifferent to when
class counsel is paid because they can be asked to place settlement

95.

See supranote 68.
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proceeds, including attorneys' fees, in escrow accounts at the time
settlements are approved by district courts, 96 it is possible that
defendants would balk at quick-pay provisions in at least two
circumstances. First, they may balk when they are concerned that the
thin capitalization of class counsel makes it uncertain whether the fee
award could be repaid should something happen to the settlement on
appeal. It is possible that the non-securities class action bar may be
less well capitalized than the securities class action bar. 97 Second,
defendants may resist quick-pay provisions when they can benefit
from delays caused by appeals-e.g., when settlements do not involve
the transfer of cash from defendants to class members but only
injunctive or in-kind relief. My dataset suggests that these
circumstances arise more often in non-securities cases: although all of
the 2006 securities settlements included cash relief, a substantial
minority of non-securities settlements did not.
Nonetheless, whatever the reason quick-pay provisions have
not been more widely adopted, they are still, undoubtedly, the most
prevalent countermeasure to objector blackmail in use today.
C. Are Quick-Pay Provisions Good for Class Members?
Despite the prevalence of quick-pay provisions, they are
apparently unknown to courts and commentators, and, as such, they
have never been scrutinized. It is therefore worth assessing whether
quick-pay provisions are good, not only from the perspective of class
counsel, but also from the perspective of class members and society as
a whole.
At first blush, quick pay provisions can appear entirely selfserving on the part of class counsel. In an individual representation, it
is hard to imagine any client who would agree to permit his
contingency-fee lawyer to receive fees from the defendant months or
years before he would be entitled to receive his own award; 98 to the

96. Indeed, sometimes they are required to do so even before the settlement has received
final approval. See, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement at 8, New England Health Care Employees
Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 627 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (No. 98-99) ('The
[Settlement Fund] shall be transferred by the Defendants' insurers . . .to the Escrow Agent
within ten (10) days following the entry by the Court of an Order... preliminarily approving
this settlement....").
97. Indeed, class action lawyers have reported to me that defendants occasionally demand
such onerous terms to guarantee repayment (e.g., letters of credit, etc.) that they sometimes drop
their demand for quick-pay provisions.
98. It is common for class counsel to receive their fees before class members actually receive
compensation from settlements because it can take many months or even years to distribute
settlement proceeds to class members. But quick-pay provisions take this phenomenon several
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extent either party is permitted to receive money early with the
promise to pay it back should something occur on appeal, one might
imagine the client demanding that privilege for himself. Moreover, in
many class actions-those that are not governed by a fee-shifting
statute-one of the bases for awarding attorneys' fees in the first place
is restitution: the lawyers have enriched the class, and it would be
unjust not to compensate them for doing so. 99 Before the appeals from
the settlement are resolved, however, the class has not been enriched,
and one would think there would be little injustice in waiting until the
class has been benefited to pay the class action lawyers.
Nonetheless, quick-pay provisions may not be entirely selfserving; class members may benefit from the provisions as well. For
one thing, insofar as these provisions reduce the holdout tax that can
be assessed against class counsel, they may make class action
litigation more attractive to class counsel, and thereby increase the
number of cases they file. This is, of course, a benefit to the class
members they represent. Moreover, class members may benefit from
quick-pay provisions because the provisions so suppress the holdout
tax that they discourage some objectors from filing meritless appeals
in the first place. If quick-pay provisions lead to fewer appeals being
filed in the first place (as opposed to the same number of appeals
being filed but settled for smaller sums), then there may be more cases
in which no appeals at all are filed; fewer appeals means more cases in
which class members can be paid sooner. That is, it is possible that
quick-pay provisions will accelerate settlement payments to class
members.
At the same time, insofar as quick-pay provisions are valuable
to class counsel, one might expect that the defendants who must agree
to the provisions would be able to extract something in returnperhaps a smaller total settlement amount. If this is the case, then
class members might be harmed by the provisions to some extent.
Moreover, quick-pay provisions are not without risks to class members
even if class counsel do not trade away some portion of their
recoveries: if class counsel are, for some reason, unable to repay the
attorneys' fees they have received early, class members may be left
without any way to recover them. For these reasons, it cannot be said
with certainty that quick-pay provisions are a net benefit to class
members.
steps further by permitting contingency-fee lawyers to receive their fees even before their clients'
cases are over; that is, before their clients are even legally entitled to receive compensation from
defendants.
99. See Charles Silver, A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 656, 657 (1991).
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For similar reasons, it is also unclear whether quick-pay
provisions are a net benefit from a broader social perspective. As I
noted above, insofar as the provisions make the compensation to class
action lawyers slightly more lucrative, they may lead to a greater
number of class action filings. Thus, in one sense, the question
whether quick-pay provisions are socially desirable cannot be
separated from the question whether we should have more or fewer
class action cases generally. In this regard, what is good from the
perspective of potential future class members is bad from the
perspective of potential future defendants (which, as I noted, may
explain why these provisions are not ubiquitous despite their benefits
for both class counsel and class members). But there is no easy way to
answer the question whether we should have more class actions or
fewer. It is a highly contested question of public policy, and the
answer depends on one's premises and empirical intuitions. 10 0 Because
100. For example, the predominant justification for class action litigation is the utilitarian
goal of forcing defendants to fully internalize the costs of their activities. See Myriam Gilles &
Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of
EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 105 (2006) ("There is but one true objective
here-one valid normative measure by which to gauge any class action procedure or practice, or
any proposed reform. All that matters is whether the practice causes the defendant-wrongdoer to
internalize the social costs of its actions."); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1991) (explaining that "[in the absence of
a class action device, [certain widespread, but small] injuries would often go unremedied because
most individual plaintiffs would not themselves have a sufficient economic stake in the litigation
to incur the litigation costs"). On this view, the fact that class action lawyers are not already
fully incentivized to bring every possible class action-insofar as contingency-fee lawyers bear
the full risk of the class action yet reap only a fraction of the settlement award, see, e.g., Alon
Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians?A New Approach for Monitoring Class Action
Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 34 (2002) ("Class action attorneys bear all these costs [of litigation],
yet enjoy only part of the returns.")-might speak in favor of any measure-including quick-pay
provisions-that makes class representation more lucrative. On the other hand, a utilitarian
might worry that, despite the fact that class action lawyers are not fully incentivized, they still
might be filing too many class action cases on account of the fact that they can extract a
premium from defendants who, eager to avoid either the considerable costs of litigating, see Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (noting in a class action
case that "the threat of discovery expense [can] push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases"), or the risks of an outlier jury verdict, will settle cases for more than their
expected value, see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that defendants in class actions can come under "intense pressure to settle" and might
"be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability"). A
utilitarian might also worry that some causes of action, such as those which provide for extracompensatory statutory damages, were not intended to be fully enforced; as such, further
inducing class action lawyers to bring such cases might result in (even more) overdeterrence. See
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide
Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1878 (2006) ("[Cllass settlement pressure is
most troubling when aggregation would not merely enable the enforcement of cost-prohibitive
claims, but in addition, would distort the underlying remedial scheme. The most glaring of these
situations arises when a class action would aggregate statutory damages that have been
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it is difficult to say whether we should have more class actions or
fewer, it is difficult to say whether quick-pay provisions are socially
desirable. What can be said, however, is that, regardless of one's view
of the level of class action litigation, quick-pay provisions are but a
small contribution to either the solution or the problem. Better ways
to alter compensation to class counsel exist than relying on bounties
extracted by objectors. For example, courts, which have considerable
discretion over the fees they are awarded, 0 1 are in a better position to
decide whether class action lawyers should receive more or less
money. As such, quick-pay provisions should not be the source of
major concern from a broader social perspective.
D. The Limitations of Quick-Pay Provisions
Even if quick-pay provisions do not harm class members, they
would not be a panacea. They have three significant limitations that
permit objectors to continue to extract premiums unrelated to the
merits of their appeals.
The first limitation on the effectiveness of quick-pay provisions
stems from the fact that avoiding the delay in the receipt of fee awards
is only one reason why class counsel are willing to pay objectors to
drop their appeals. For example, quick-pay provisions do not liberate
class counsel from having to defend an appeal once it is filed; as such,
objectors can still file frivolous appeals and collect a side payment
from class counsel who do not wish to spend the money to file an
appellate brief. Of course, the cost to file an appellate brief, especially
in the case of a frivolous appeal, would probably not be more than a
few thousand dollars. This amount surely pales in comparison to the
more significant premium class counsel are willing to pay to avoid the
delay associated with appeals. Thus, although this is a limitation of
quick-pay provisions, it is not an especially significant one.
But class counsel are willing to pay objectors more significant
premiums that are not mitigated by quick-pay provisions. For
example, quick-pay provisions do not eliminate the premiums class
counsel are willing to pay objectors on account of class counsel's risk
aversion. If an objector's appeal has a non-zero probability of success,
and if class counsel's fee award is sufficiently large (and class
counsel's capitalization sufficiently small), quick-pay provisions might
transform the premiums class counsel were willing to pay to avoid
decoupled from claimants' actual losses specifically in order to enable individual litigation.
Aggregation of statutory damages in this setting would make for a kind of double counting
discordant with the underlying remedial scheme.").
101. See supranote 22.
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delay into premiums they are willing to pay to avoid risk. If there is
some chance class counsel might lose the appeal, class counsel might
not place especially large fee awards into non-liquid or risky
investments pending the resolution of the appeal because they might
worry they could not repay the award should they lose. In these
scenarios, class counsel are delayed not in the receipt of their fees but
in their ability to spend them as they would like. As such, class
counsel might still be willing to pay a significant premium to objectors
in order to avoid the risk of loss on appeal. And these premiums are
rational even in the face of appeals that have very low probabilities of
success, so long as the probabilities are greater than zero. Thus, at
least for the class of settlements where fee awards are large and firm
capitalization small, the effectiveness of quick-pay provisions is
significantly limited.
The second limitation on the effectiveness of quick-pay
provisions in ending objector blackmail stems from the fact that,
although these provisions may help class counsel avoid the holdout
tax, they may help only class counsel. The conventional wisdom
regarding objector blackmail has focused on the threat vis-a-vis class
counsel, but it is possible that, in some cases, class action defendants
might themselves be eager to buy off even meritless objector appeals
in order to accelerate the final resolution of settlements. Although, as
noted above, defendants often place the corpus of the settlement in an
escrow account pending appeal and, therefore, will not have access to
the money regardless of whether the settlement is appealed, in some
special cases the fact that even meritless litigation is still pending
may create difficulties for defendants for other reasons. The most
obvious of these difficulties are created in the financial markets.
Publicly traded companies are required to report on their financial
disclosures the potential losses associated with litigation so long as it
is pending; reports of especially large pieces of litigation might disrupt
stock prices if the financial markets are unable to discriminate
between settlements delayed by potentially meritorious appeals and
settlements delayed by wholly meritless ones. For similar reasons,
class action litigation prolonged even on meritless grounds could
possibly interfere with corporate merger and acquisition activities. 102
In either case, defendants might be willing to pay considerable
premiums to settle class action litigation, quick-pay provisions
102. See, e.g., Vanessa O'Connell, Tobacco Firms Exposed to New $200 Billion Claim-Kraft
Spinoff Faces Delay After 'Light Cigarette' Suit Gets Class Action Status, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26,
2006, at A3 (reporting that pending $200 billion class action against Philip Morris "will delay an
expected plan by Philip Morris USA parent Altria Group Inc. to spin off its Kraft Foods Inc.
unit").
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notwithstanding. Although it is unclear how often class action
litigation can cause these sorts of disruptions in the financial markets,
defendants will undoubtedly be willing to pay handsomely to avoid
them. Thus, at least in this class of cases, quick-pay provisions are,
again, a severely limited response to objector blackmail.
The third and final limitation on the effectiveness of quick-pay
provisions stems from the fact that, in order for quick-pay provisions
to appear in settlement agreements, defendants must consent to them.
Insofar as these provisions are valuable to class counsel because they
save class counsel from paying blackmail to objectors, defendants
could insist on receiving some portion of the savings for themselves
before agreeing to include the provisions in settlement agreements.
That is, quick-pay provisions may simply transfer the blackmail
leverage from class action objectors to class action defendants. If this
is the case, then quick-pay provisions might not reduce the blackmail
tax so much as change to whom the tax is paid. This scenario
obviously constitutes a very serious limitation on the effectiveness of
quick-pay provisions. Indeed, it raises the question whether we should
look for more effective responses to the blackmail problem.
V. ARE QUICK-PAY PROVISIONS THE BEST SOLUTION TO OBJECTOR

BLACKMAIL?
In light of the significant limitations on quick-pay provisions
discussed above, this Part analyzes whether there are better solutions
to the blackmail problem. In my view, the solutions proposed by courts
and commentators-sanctions and large appellate bonds-are not
preferable to quick-pay provisions because they are likely to chill
legitimate objectors along with blackmail-minded ones. Moreover, in
light of the fact that objectors provide the only adversarial testing of
class action settlements, it would be even worse to undo the Supreme
Court's holding in Devlin and forbid objectors from appealing
settlements altogether.
But this does not mean that we are left without a complete
solution to the blackmail problem. Rather, drawing on property law
scholarship, I argue that an inalienability rule that prohibits class
action objectors from settling their appeals would be a complete
10 3
solution to objector blackmail.

103. Another potential solution to the blackmail problem might be to use expedited review of
appeals brought by class members. But insofar as avoiding delay is only one of the reasons class
counsel are willing to pay objectors to drop their appeals, this solution, like quick-pay provisions,
would not completely solve the blackmail problem. Moreover, it is unclear whether appeals by
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A. The Solutions Proposed by Courts and Commentators
Two other solutions to the blackmail problem have been
proposed by courts and commentators. The first solution, proposed by
commentators, is to sanction class members for raising objections later
deemed insubstantial. 10 4 The second solution, adopted by some district
courts, is to require class members who wish to appeal settlements or
awards of attorneys' fees to post large bonds under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 7.105 In my view, these provisions are inferior to
quick-pay provisions as solutions to objector blackmail.
The trouble with the use of ex post sanctions against class
action objectors is that district courts may not be very good at
separating frivolous objections-challenges that are filed only to
extract a premium for causing delay-from uninformed objections filed
for less sinister reasons or from objections that may have some merit
depending on which judge is looking at them. Not only do district
courts face docket pressures that may make them especially eager to
discourage anything that might interfere with the termination of
unwieldy class litigation, 106 but they are naturally predisposed to see
their own rulings as beyond reproach. Consider, for example, that
some district courts have found objections to fee awards to be
"frivolous" even when those awards are in excess of the median class
action award of 25 percent. 10 7 There may be many questions for which
there is a correct answer in the law, but the percentage of a settlement

class members have any better claim to expedited treatment than other civil appeals that could
also benefit from such treatment.
104. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingThe Plaintiff'sAttorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 714 n.121 (1986) ("Although the case law may require full and elaborate
judicial review before a settlement is approved, it is doubtful that courts have much incentive to
be very demanding. Their deferential attitude is probably best expressed by one recent decision
which acknowledged that: 'In deciding whether to approve this settlement proposal, the court
starts from the familiar axiom that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.' ");
Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1122-24
(1996) (arguing that class actions "magnify" district courts' "strong disposition toward
settlements" because "the alternatives-trying the class action or, worse yet, trying the
multitude of suits that make up the class action individually-are particularly burdensome
alternatives," and noting that a study by the Federal Judicial Center "shows that the average
fairness hearing takes up about 40 minutes of court time").
107. See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. MDL 02-MIL-1475 DT, 2005 WL 2401111, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2005) (noting that one argument on appeal would be "that the attorneys' fees
in this case should have been capped at the 25% benchmark").
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that should be awarded to class action attorneys is not one of them.108
If challenging a fee award above the median can be frivolous, then any
appeal from a class action settlement can be. Thus, ex post sanctions
will inevitably chill some class members who would raise substantial
objections from doing so. This sort of overdeterrence of objections to
class action settlements is a serious concern because typically no
adversarial testing of class action settlements occurs unless objectors
contest them. 10 9 Moreover, even when an objector is not chilled, there
is nothing to stop the objector from demanding a premium above the
expected value of her objection to settle any appeal. That is, class
counsel are willing to pay a premium to avoid delay, litigation
expenses, and risk, even with appeals that have merit. Quick-pay
provisions, by contrast, reduce this willingness for meritorious and
non-meritorious appeals alike. Thus, it is not clear whether ex post
sanctions would reduce the holdout tax any better than do quick-pay
provisions. As such, the dubious marginal benefits of ex post sanctions
do not seem worth the cost of chilling legitimate objections.
Requiring objectors to post large bonds to appeal settlements is
an equally inferior solution to the blackmail problem. These bonds
have been required under Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which permits district courts to order "an appellant to file
a bond or provide other security.., to ensure payment of costs on
appeal." 110 Although the word "costs" in Rule 7 has usually been
understood to include only the mundane items provided for in Rule
39 1 1 1-such as the paltry expenses of photocopying and binding the
appellate briefs and appendices, and the expense of obtaining the
portions of the trial reporter's transcript that are necessary for the
appealI 12-- courts have begun to require much more of class members
who wish to appeal a settlement or fee award. Perhaps the most
extreme examples are courts that have begun requiring objectors to
post bonds to cover the increased expense in settlement

108. See supra note 22 (discussing the methods used to award fees to class counsel and the
discretion courts exercise under these methods).
109. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting role of objectors in providing
adversarial testing of class action settlements).
110. FED. R. APP. P. 7.
111. See, e.g., In re Am. President Lines, Inc., 779 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The costs
referred to [in Rule 7] are simply those that may be taxed against an unsuccessful litigant under
Federal Appellate Rule 39, and do not include attorneys' fees that may be assessed on appeal.");
16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3953 (4th ed. 2008)
(surveying relevant case law and observing that Rule 7 costs are generally those taxable under
Appellate Rule 39 but that circuits are split as to whether Rule 7 costs include attorney fees).
112. See FED. R. APP. P. 39 (setting forth rules for taxation of costs on appeal).
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administration caused by an appeal. 113 These expenses result from the
fact that the settlements are often distributed by for-profit companies,
and these companies must be kept on retainer during an appeal
(because they have already begun their work before the settlement is
even approved). 114 These expenses can be enormous. 11 5 Other courts
have required objectors to post bonds to cover any interest on the
settlement or attorneys' fees that would have accrued during an
appeal; these expenses, too, can be massive. 116 Still other courts have
required objectors to post bonds to cover the projected attorneys' fees
class counsel and the defendant would expend defending the
settlement on appeal, either on the theory than an appeal is frivolous
and the court of appeals is likely to assess attorneys' fees as a sanction
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38117 or because the
statute on which the class suit was originally based shifted attorneys'

113. See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 812, 815, 817 (6th Cir. 2004)
(affirming Rule 7 bond that included "$123,429.00 in incremental administration costs" because
the state law on which the suit was based required plaintiffs to pay "damages" to defendants for
filing frivolous litigation); In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 520 F. Supp. 2d
274, 279 (D. Mass. 2007) (including in Rule 7 bond "administrative costs attributable to delay in
[settlement] distribution"); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., No.
MDL 1361, 2003 WL 22417252 (D. Me. Oct. 7, 2003) (granting Rule 7 appeal bond and taking
into account plaintiffs' claim that appeal was frivolous and requests for reproduction costs,
attorneys' fees, and various other administration costs); In re NASDAQ Market-Makers
Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (including $50,000 in Rule 7 bond for
"damages resulting from the delay and/or disruption of settlement administration").
114. See NASDAQ Market-Makers, 187 F.R.D. at 128 (citing plaintiffs' argument that
distribution delays cause "waste" to settlement funds as "the processing of claims is interrupted
and restarted, with additional expenses necessarily incurred in extending the leases on office
space and the leases on equipment, extending insurance and website maintenance, picking up
mail and answering inquiries about the status of claims administration during its hiatus, and
rehiring and retraining of the claims administration staff').
115. See, e.g., id. at 128 ("Plaintiffs aver that the disruption costs resulting from even a sixmonth shut-down of settlement administration would total approximately $526,100.").
116. See, e.g., Barnes v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395-NG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71072, at *8-9 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (including in Rule 7 bond "5.15% interest on a
settlement of $12.5 million ... for one year" or $643,750); Conroy v. 3M Corp., No. C 00-2810CW,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96169, at *6, *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2006) (including in Rule 7 bond
"$239,667 in anticipated post-judgment interest to compensate for the delayed distribution of the
$4.1 million cash portion of the settlement").
117. See, e.g., Compact Disc Minimum, 2003 WL 22417252, at *1 (including attorneys' fees
on appeal in Rule 7 bond because a "Rule 7 bond can cover damages assessed under Fed. R. App.
P. 38"); Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d 738, 751 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2007)
(including attorneys' fees because "amount of bond should reflect the significant possibility that
any objector's appeal will be subject to Fed. R.App. P. 38"), rev'd by 507 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2007);
cf. Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 817 (affirming Rule 7 bond that included $50,000 in attorneys' fees
because the state law on which the suit was based required plaintiffs to pay "damages" to
defendants for filing frivolous litigation).
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fees to prevailing plaintiffs. 118 At least one judge went even further:
after adding up many of the foregoing expenses, the judge then
doubled the required bond because he believed the class members
were attempting to blackmail class counsel. 119 All told, the required
bonds can reach hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. 120
I am skeptical that Rule 7 permits district courts to require
bonds in these amounts. I doubt, for example, that a statute that
permits prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees from defendants
should be interpreted through the lens of Rule 7 to permit some
prevailing plaintiffs (i.e., class members who fully support the
settlement) to recover attorneys' fees from other prevailing plaintiffs
(i.e., those class members who do not fully support it but who are
nonetheless bound by it).121 Moreover, the notion that class members
should be required to post bonds for interest on the settlement or
expenses related to delayed settlement administration appears to
122
confuse costs bonds under Rule 7 with supersedeas bonds.
Nonetheless, it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether
118. See, e.g., In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. MDL 02-ML-1475 DT, 2005 WL 2401111, at *5
n.8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2005) (including attorneys' fees on appeal in Rule 7 bond because the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act "permits attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff'),
vacated, 2007 WL 1340633 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007); NASDAQ Market-Makers, 187 F.R.D. at 128
(including $50,000 in attorneys' fees on appeal in Rule 7 bond because the Clayton Act permits
plaintiffs to recover the "cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee").
119. See Heritage Bond, 2005 WL 2401111, at *5 ("[I]n full view of the frivolousness and
disingenuous nature of the appeal ... this Court finds that two times the requested amount, or
$208,000, is appropriate."), vacated on other grounds, 2007 WL 1340633 (9th Cir. May 8, 2007).
120. See, e.g., Vaughn, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 721 (requiring objector to post Rule 7 bond for
$150,000); Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 91-0986-CIV, 2006 WL 1132371, at *18
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2006) (requiring objector to post Rule 7 bond in the amount of $13,500,000 for
"damages, costs and interest that the entire class will lose as a result of the appeal"); Carnegie v.
Household Bank (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2006) (requiring objectors to each post Rule 7 bonds of
$1,479,295); Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *8-9 (requiring objector to post Rule 7
bond of over $645,000); Conroy, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96169, at *11 (requiring objector to post
Rule 7 bond of $431,167); HeritageBond, 2005 WL 2401111, at *9 (requiring one set of objectors
to post Rule 7 bond for $208,000 and another objector to do so for $228,000); Downey v. Mortgage
Guar. Ins. Corp., No. Civ.A 100-108, 2001 WL 34092617 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 1, 2001) (requiring six
objectors to post Rule 7 bond in the amount of $180,000).
121. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 233 Fed. App'x 627, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (vacating bond
for similar reasons). The Federal Appellate Rules Standing Committee recently considered
amending Rule 7 to make clear that its costs bonds should not include attorneys' fees. See
Minutes of the Standing Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure (Jan. 2008)
(reporting that the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure had
recommended such an amendment because of "the risk that large appeal bonds could chill
meritorious appeals"). However, the Committee ultimately decided not to act on the amendment
in light of disagreements over its potential effects and whether it should apply to both class and
non-class litigation. See id. (Jan. 2009) (reporting that Advisory Committee had removed the
amendment to Rule 7 from its agenda).
122. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2000 WL 1665134, at *2-3 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 6, 2000) (denying large bond on this basis).
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district courts have such doctrinal authority; courts are split on many
123
of these issues.
Rather, this Article questions whether these large bonds are
preferable to quick-pay provisions. To the extent that these bonds are
ordered without any examination of whether the objectors are engaged
in blackmail, there can be little doubt that these bonds discourage
even appeals by class members with substantial objections. Few
objectors have the money to post such large bonds and even fewer
have enough at stake individually in class actions to make it
worthwhile to do so. Moreover, even when large bonds are required
only when district courts believe objectors are engaged in blackmail,
as I noted above, permitting district courts to determine whether
appeals from their own rulings are frivolous is not without peril.
Indeed, permitting district courts to order large Rule 7 bonds
effectively allows them to decide whether their own rulings can be
challenged on appeal, and it is easy to imagine why they might
overuse this authority. As one court of appeals has noted, "imposing
too great a burden on an objector's right to appeal may ...tend to
insulate a district court's judgment in approving a class settlement
from appellate review." 124 But perhaps worst of all, large Rule 7 bonds
may deter appeals only by class members who are not blackmail
minded. Blackmail-minded objectors motivated only by delay might be
able to cause that delay even in the face of Rule 7 bonds simply by
appealing the orders requiring them to post the bonds at the same
time they appeal the class action settlements! 25 Finally, as with ex
post sanctions, nothing stops those objectors willing to post the bonds
from then extracting a premium from class counsel to settle their
appeals. As such, and despite the considerable costs of deterring
meritorious appeals, it is not at all clear how much large Rule 7 bonds

123. For example, on the question of whether class members can be required under Rule 7 to
post a bond for projected attorneys' fees, compare In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d
812, 817 (6th Cir. 2004) (permitting the practice) with Vaughn, 507 F.3d at 299 (rejecting the
practice) and Heritage Bond, 233 Fed. App'x at 631 (same). On the question of whether class
members can be required under Rule 7 to post a bond for expenses related to a delay in
settlement administration, compare Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 817 (permitting the practice) with
Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1665134, at *3-5 (construing Third Circuit case law to reject the practice).
Finally, on the question of whether class members can be required under Rule 7 to post a bond
for interest that will accrue on the settlement or attorneys' fees, compare Barnes, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71072, at *8-9 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006) (interpreting First Circuit case law to permit the
practice) with Vaughn, 507 F.3d at 299 (rejecting the practice at least where the settlement
agreement does not call for it).
124. See Vaughn, 507 F.3d at 300.
125. See, e.g., Cardizem, 391 F.3d at 814-16 (consolidating appeal from bond order with
appeal from class action settlement).
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would reduce the holdout tax beyond the reductions achieved with
126
quick-pay provisions.
B. Undoing Devlin v. Scardeletti
Another potential solution to the blackmail problem is to undo
the Supreme Court's ruling in Devlin, which permitted objectors to
take appeals from the approval of class action settlements in the first
place. Congress could undo that ruling by statute, or federal
rulemakers could do so by amending the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. In my view, however, undoing Devlin is either unlikely to
have much effect on the blackmail problem, or, if it does have an
effect, it will only come at a very high cost of preventing class
members with legitimate concerns from obtaining appellate review of
settlements. Thus, undoing Devlin strikes me as a particularly poor
solution to the blackmail problem.
In order to see why undoing Devlin is a poor solution, consider
how it might be undone. One way to undo the decision is to change
Devlin's rule on which class members can appeal settlements from any
class member who files an objection to any class members who files an
objection and formally intervenes before the district court; this was
the rule advocated by the federal government and the dissenting
Justices in Devlin.127 The trouble with this rule, however, is that it is
unlikely to suppress much objector blackmail. Any class member
savvy enough to understand the blackmail scheme will be savvy
enough to file a motion to intervene in the litigation, especially in light
of the fact that class members could be permitted to intervene even if
only for the purpose of pursuing an appeal.1 28 Although requiring
objectors to jump through one more technical hoop to appeal makes
taking appeals more costly, it is unlikely to deter even modestly
lucrative blackmail opportunities. District courts might be able to
deny intervention to class members who are blackmail minded, 129 but,

126. It should be noted that, although I believe ex post sanctions and large appellate bonds
are inferior to quick-pay provisions as solutions to the blackmail problem, in settlements where
defendants are unwilling to agree to quick-pay provisions, these solutions may be the only ones
available to the district court. As such, it is possible that these solutions are preferable to doing
nothing at all.
127. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 11 (2002); id. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. See id. at 12 (noting that the federal government argued that "such a limited purpose
intervention generally should be available to all those . . . whose objections at the fairness
hearing have been disregarded").
129. In Devlin, the federal government argued that class members would be permitted to
intervene as of right, id., but Justice Scalia argued in his dissent that, even still, the district
court might be able to serve a gate-keeping function by denying intervention to the most obvious

1658

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:6:1623

as noted above, when district courts exercise power in this context,
they are essentially deciding whether to insulate their own rulings
from appellate review-not to mention whether to resolve a major
drain on their dockets. This does not create the best system of
incentives. Moreover, as with requiring large appellate bonds, one
wonders if the only objectors who would be affected by undoing Devlin
in this manner would be those who are not blackmail minded: just as
blackmail-minded objectors could hold up settlements by appealing
the bond ordered by the district court, presumably they could do the
same by appealing the district court's order denying their motion to
intervene. 130
A more potent way to undo Devlin would be to forbid objecting
class members from appealing settlements altogether-regardless of
whether or not they intervened. Although this would certainly end
objector blackmail-if objectors cannot appeal, they cannot collect side
settlements for dropping their appeals-it would come at a very steep
price. As noted above, objectors typically provide the only adversarial
testing of class action settlements; forbidding objectors from appealing
would basically leave appellate review of class action settlements to
those instances where class counsel was unhappy with the fees that
the district court awarded. This would leave class action settlements
with very little appellate scrutiny, and scrutiny in only one direction.
In light of all of the agency problems that bedevil class action
litigation, I can think of no reason why the resolution of this type of
litigation should be subjected to lesser judicial scrutiny than other
types of litigation; if anything, there should be more scrutiny of class
action litigation, not less.
A middle course between a weak rule requiring class members
to intervene before appealing and a harsh rule forbidding class
members from appealing altogether would be a rule that permits class
members to appeal settlements, but not to appeal them as of right.
That is, a middle course might ask courts of appeals to screen whether
a class member's appeal has sufficient merit to be heard with full
appellate review. A similar process already exists under Rule 23 for
taking an interlocutory appeal of the district court's decision to certify

blackmail artists, see id. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the district court could rule on
whether "the objections to the settlement were procedurally deficient, late filed, or simply
inapposite to the case").
130. See id. at 17 ("[Tjhere is no dispute that [a class member can] appeal the District Court's
collateral order denying his motion to intervene .... "); Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)
("[S]uch motions are, of course, appealable.').
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a class. 131 Although this approach may have the virtue of accelerating
the rejection of the most frivolous appeals, in light of the fact that
class counsel have other reasons to buy off objector appeals besides
delay avoidance, this rule may not completely solve the blackmail
problem. Moreover, for the same reasons we might worry about the
incentives of district courts asked to decide whether their rulings
should be insulated from appeal, we might also worry about the
incentives of appellate courts asked to decide whether to increase their
32
workload by an additional appeal.'
C. The Optimal Solution to Objector Blackmail: InalienabilityRules
In light of the problems with undoing Devlin and the risks of ex
post sanctions and large Rule 7 bonds, quick-pay provisions-despite
their significant limitations-may very well be the best solution
conceived thus far to objector blackmail. There is, however, another
solution to objector blackmail that suffers from none of the limitations
of quick-pay provisions and poses none of the risks of sanctions and
bonds: an inalienability rule prohibiting objectors from settling their
appeals.
For many years, scholars of property law have explored the
possibility of using inalienability rules-rules that prohibit the sale of
an entitlement-to mitigate the threats of holdouts and blackmail in
voluntary market transactions. 133 This literature shows how
inalienability rules can completely solve the holdout problem posed by
class action objectors.
The efficient allocation of resources in a society is often best
achieved with property rules: Give one party an entitlement that can
be transferred to another only through a voluntary transaction with
the other party. If the other party values the entitlement more than
the initial party, the transaction takes place; if the other party does

131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) ("A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal
is filed with the circuit clerk within 10 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders,").
132. On this point, it may be worth noting that the only federal court with a docket that is
almost entirely discretionary is the United States Supreme Court and its docket has significantly
declined in size in recent decades.
133. The first treatment of inalienability rules was the famous article by Guido Calabresi
and Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Although Professor Calabresi and Mr. Melamed did not
discuss inalienability rules in the contexts of holdouts and blackmail specifically, subsequent
scholars have done so. See, e.g., Ayres & Madison, supra note 12; Heller, supra note 12; Fennell,
supra note 12.
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not, the transaction does not take place. 134 This is the regime
currently at work with class action objectors: objectors have a right to
appeal settlements, and class counsel can take that right away only if
both the objector and class counsel agree on a price.
In
some
circumstances,
however,
voluntary
market
transactions can be inefficient. One such example is when
transactions must occur between specific parties-e.g., when one party
has monopoly power or where one party can disrupt or delay a
transaction by withholding his or her consent. 135 If the buyer places a
particularly high value on the entitlement even though it is worthless
to almost everyone else, then the seller might acquire the entitlement
solely for the purpose of selling it to the buyer. 136 These sort of
strategic acquisitions, which themselves do not create utility but only
increase the cost of properly allocating resources, are the unfortunate
side effects of allocating resources solely through property rules. And,
of course, they are the unfortunate predicament in which class counsel
find themselves vis-A-vis class action objectors: the right to take a
frivolous appeal is worth nothing to anyone but class counsel, who is
eager to avoid delay, risk, and litigation expenses.
One solution to the problem of thin markets is a liability rule:
Permit the buyer to take the entitlement from the seller and have a
court set the price at which the transaction takes place.1 37 The
problem with liability rules, however, is that courts are neither very
good at setting prices nor very good at separating strategic sellers
from those who sincerely place an unusually high value on an
138
entitlement.
As a result, scholars have advocated the use of inalienability
rules-rules that prohibit sellers from transferring an entitlement
altogether-to combat the inefficiencies of strategic acquisition of

134. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1092 (noting that property rules "leto each
of the parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him").
135. See Fennell, supra note 12, at 1423-27, 1438-39 (noting that a "paradigmatic source of
inefficiency is the costly wrangling associated with bilateral monopoly," including "blackmail,"
and the related problem of "the possibility that a party whose entitlement is crucial to the
necessary assembly will attempt to 'hold out' for a larger share of the assembly surplus").
136. See id. at 1423 (noting that the risk of "wasteful negotiation" is high when an
entitlement "has an idiosyncratically high value for a single buyer while remaining worthless, or
very nearly so, to everyone else").
137. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1106-07 (noting that if society can
accurately gauge the value of entitlements, then "the holdout problem is gone" and "an argument
can readily be made for moving from a property rule to a liability rule"); Fennell, supra note 12,
at 1439 (noting that the problem of holdouts is "usually approached... through liability rules").
138. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 12, at 1108 ("We cannot be at all sure that [the
landowner] is lying or holding out when he says his land is worth $12,000 to him.")

2009]

THE END OF OBJECTOR BLACKMAIL?

1661

entitlements. 139 The theory behind inalienability rules is that
prohibiting the sale of an entitlement will change who chooses to
acquire the entitlement ex ante. 140 This is the case because, as
Professor Fennell has put it, if entitlements are inalienable,
"[f]oreseeing the inability to sell, those motivated solely by resale
opportunities would simply select out of the market. '' 141 The reason
inalienability rules succeed where property and liability rules fail is
essentially because inalienability rules do a better job than do courts
at generating information about why someone would want to acquire
an entitlement in the first place: inalienability rules separate those
persons who wish to acquire an entitlement for strategic reasons from
those sellers who genuinely value the entitlement. 142 Thus, one way to
prevent parties from acquiring entitlements for the purposes of
holding out and blackmailing another party is to prevent those parties
from selling the entitlements they acquire.
Although the virtues of inalienability rules have been noted
most frequently in the context of property transfers, the rules have
also been employed in the literature on settlement of litigation. One
such example can be found in the article by Randy Kozel and David
Rosenberg calling for a prohibition on the ability to settle litigation
before summary judgment. 143 The authors described their proposal as
a solution to the problem of frivolous litigation: if plaintiffs know that
defendants cannot settle suits prior to summary judgment to avoid
litigation costs (and if they know their suits will be dismissed on
summary judgment), then plaintiffs will not file frivolous suits in the
first place.1 44 Although the authors did not describe their proposal as
such, it is an example of an inalienability rule.

139. See id. at 1111 ("While at first glance efficiency objectives may seem undermined by
limitations on the ability to engage in transactions, closer analysis suggests that there are
instances, perhaps many, in which economic efficiency is more closely approximated by such
limitations. This might occur when a transaction would create significant externalities ....");
Fennell, supra note 12, at 1440 ("Alienability restrictions more straightforwardly select against
those whose primary value is in reselling.").
140. See Fennell, supra note 12, at 1412-13 (noting "inalienability's impact on ex ante
incentives to acquire and use goods that are not deemed intrinsically unsuited for market
transfer").
141. Id. at 1420.
142. See id. at 1424 (noting that an inalienability rule can be a "mechanism for filtering out.
transactions [that are] worthless intermediations that introduce bargaining dilemmas without
any countervailing social benefits").
143. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement
Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004).
144. See id. at 1860-64 (discussing authors' proposed model for deterring frivolous litigation
or "nuisance-value strategies" in the class action context).
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An inalienability rule would serve the same salubrious
purposes in the context of class action objectors. If objectors were
prohibited from selling their right to appeal to class counsel, then
objectors who wished to appeal solely to extract rents from class
counsel eager to avoid delay, risk, and litigation costs would not
bother filing appeals at all. Indeed, even objectors who had legitimate
appeals but who were happy to settle their appeals for a premium
would be unable to collect those premiums. In short, inalienability
rules completely eliminate any sort of holdout tax. In this respect,
inalienability rules are superior to quick-pay provisions because, in
light of the limitations of quick-pay provisions, objectors can still
collect premiums from class counsel eager to avoid risk and litigation
expenses.
At the same time, no legitimate objector would be discouraged
from having their appeals heard in the face of an inalienability rule;
the rule would not affect access to appellate review at all. That is, an
inalienability rule can thwart blackmail-minded objectors at the same
time it leaves access to appellate review open to sincere objectors. In
this respect, inalienability rules are superior to the ex post sanctions
and large appellate bonds advocated and adopted by courts and
commentators; as I explained above, these devices will inevitably chill
145
legitimate objector appeals.
Inalienability rules typically come with one very big downside:
unless they can somehow be restricted only to strategic acquirers, they
will prohibit utility-enhancing transactions as well as utilitydiminishing ones. 146 For example, in the context of property transfers,
an inalienability rule that discourages strategic acquisition also
prevents a sincere acquirer from finding a higher-value use for the
same entitlement. 47 Indeed, this problem with inalienability rules is
especially acute in the context of litigation settlements: it is thought
that settlement at some price is almost always preferable to further
litigation, no matter how meritorious the suit, because the parties can
achieve results substantially similar to the expected outcome of
adjudication without incurring litigation expenses.1 48 Thus, a rule that

145. See id. at 1904-05 (explaining how sanctions for frivolous litigation are inferior to
inalienability rules).
146. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 12, at 1420 ("Driving out transactions is usually a bad idea
....

.).

147. See id. at 1454-55 ("Alienability restrictions could screen out those building [spite
fences] for strategic reasons .. . [but] by blocking potential bargains, such rules risk leaving in
place inefficiently ugly but earnestly constructed fences.").
148. See SHAVELL, supra note 2, at 403, 406 (discussing extent to which, in the litigation
context, parties are likely to prefer settlement rather than prolonged litigation).
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prohibits the settlement of litigation (including settlement merely
149
before summary judgment, as Kozel and Rosenberg advocated ) will
prevent some nonfrivolous litigation from settling (or at least prevent
it from settling as quickly as it might have, in the case of Kozel and
Rosenberg's proposal) even though settlement would have been
preferable.
Fortunately, this downside to inalienability rules may not have
much, if any, application in the context of class action objections. This
is because the only objector appeals for which it is socially desirable to
settle rather than litigate are the ones that an inalienability rule
would discourage from being filed in the first place: those that serve
no purpose but to delay the finality of the settlement. By contrast,
unlike ordinary litigation, it is generally not utility-enhancing to settle
nonfrivolous objector appeals. This is the case because settlement of
objector appeals is rife with agency problems and foregone positive
externalities: virtually any nonfrivolous appeal brought by an objector,
if vindicated, will benefit not only the objector who brought the appeal
but other class members as well. For example, if an objector appeals
the size of the fee award class counsel received, a lower award will
often benefit every other class member pro rata. 150 Similarly, if an
objector appeals the manner in which the settlement was to be
allocated among class members, all class members who are similarly
situated to the objector (i.e., those who bought shares in a company
before a certain date, those who suffered certain physical injuries, etc.)
stand to benefit from the appeal as well. Indeed, it is difficult to
conceive of any objector appeal-save the frivolous ones that do
nothing but delay the finality of the settlement-that would not
deprive other class members of its potential benefits when it is settled
by class counsel. 151 It is for this reason that some commentators have
149. See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 143, at 1876 ("[A]pplication of [mandatory summary
judgment] to the separate action process has the potential to add expense to the settlement of
non-nuisance-value cases.").
150. This is the case when fee awards come from the corpus of the settlement rather than
from the defendant pursuant to a fee-shifting statute. In the case of fee-shifting statutes, neither
the objector nor any other class member stands to gain personally from a lower fee award;
nonetheless, class members may enjoy the right to appeal those awards. See, e.g., In re Cendant
Corp. PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d 722, 727-32 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that class members had
standing to appeal fee award even though any reduction in the award would go to the defendant
rather than class members).
151. Sometimes class members raise objections to settlements that go to the propriety of
certifying the class in the first place as opposed to merely reallocating the settlement proceeds
away from class counsel or other class members. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591 (1997) (vindicating objector appeals complaining that the class was certified in violation
of the Rule 23 requirement that the lead plaintiff and class counsel adequately represent absent
class members). One might argue that other class members benefit from settling such appeals
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advocated forbidding class counsel from settling with objectors at any
152
point in the settlement process.
Indeed, this general disfavor toward side settlements with
individual class members is also the reason the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were amended in 2003 to prevent class members from
withdrawing their objections in the district court before the court rules
on approval of the settlement. 15 3 Rule 23 now requires the district
court's approval for any such withdrawal. 154 In my view, there is little
reason not to promulgate a similar rule for appeals taken by objectors.
Such a rule would not only prevent class counsel from settling appeals
that could redound to the benefit of class members other than the
objector-the traditional concern among commentators advocating
such an approach-but it could also serve the equally salubrious end
of solving the problem of objector blackmail. In short, an inalienability
rule would prevent holdouts from extracting any tax from class
counsel, and it would do so while preserving the opportunity for other
class members to have their appeals heard. As such, an inalienability
rule may be the optimal solution to the problem of objector
blackmail. 155
because permitting them to go forward might scuttle the settlement altogether, thereby leaving
the other class members with nothing at all. But, if Rule 23 would not permit a piece of litigation
to proceed as a class action, then it probably should not proceed as a class action; if the Rule is
preventing socially useful class actions from going forward, then it strikes me that the better
course is to rework the Rule rather to permit class action lawyers who think they know better to
circumvent it. In addition, I am skeptical that very many of these objectors seek to scuttle
settlements altogether. For example, in the Amchem litigation, although the objectors
complained that the prerequisites to certification had not been satisfied, the gravamen of their
complaint was that some class members (those with present injuries) were getting more than
others (those with future injuries), See id. Many such complaints can be fixed by revising the
settlement or at least renegotiating it under a different structure of class representation; to the
extent that such problems cannot be solved in light of Rule 23, then, again, it would seem that
the proper course would be to rework Rule 23 rather than allow class counsel to circumvent it.
152. See, e.g., Koniak & Cohen, supra note 67, at 132 ("Paying objectors and their counsel to
drop their challenges to class settlements is, at best, legally questionable behavior and, at worst,
evidence of collusion and inadequate representation."); Katherine Ikeda, Note, Silencing The
Objectors, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 203-04 (2001) (discussing problems with judicially
endorsed practice of side settlements between class counsel and class objectors and arguing that
courts should require class counsel to disclose side settlements for review).
153. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4)(B) 2003 advisory committee's note (revised and renumbered
as 23(e)(5)).
154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5).
155. It is important to note that an inalienability rule should not simply push back the period
in which side settlements are negotiated to the thirty days during which an objector must file a
notice of appeal. As Kozel and Rosenberg explain in the context of their mandatory-summaryjudgment inalienability rule, because blackmail-minded, nuisance litigants lose all of their
leverage once they file their suits (in this case, their appeals), their negotiating opponents can
"costlessly and credibly" reject any pre-filing settlement demand "with a dismissive, 'See you in
court.'" Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 143, at 1863-64. On the other hand, because legitimate
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Although an effective inalienability rule could take many
forms, perhaps the most effective rule would prevent all settlement of
objector appeals that did not involve a modification of the underlying
class action agreement for the benefit of rest of the class. This rule
would go beyond Rule 23 insofar as it would not permit the settlement
of an appeal solely for money, even if a court were willing to approve
it; in light of the dangers of trying to separate blackmail-minded
objectors from legitimate ones, as well as the danger of foregoing
positive externalities to other class members, there is little reason to
allow settlements that do not involve a modification to the underlying
class action agreement. On the other hand, objectors should be
permitted to settle their appeals if the settlements involve a
modification to the underlying class action agreement. Such
modifications make it at least facially plausible that other class
members are also benefited from the concerns raised by the settling
objectors. Moreover, modifications would need to return to the district
court for approval; district courts could filter merely cosmetic
modifications from those in which other class members shared equally
in the benefits sought by the settling objector. Of course, if an objector
wished to drop her appeal and receive nothing at all in return (e.g.,
because she no longer wished to pursue the matter given its expense,
chances of success, etc.), the objector should be allowed to do so, so
long as some mechanism exists to verify that the objector has, in fact,
received nothing in return (e.g., a certification under oath to that
effect).156
It is true that an inalienability rule of this sort might create
more work for courts of appeals insofar as class members unable to
settle will end up litigating a greater number of appeals to fruition.
Nonetheless, the amount of extra work is likely to be relatively trivial.
As showed in Table 1, only twenty-seven class action settlements in all
of 2006 were appealed by class members. It would not overtax the
appellate courts, which decide thousands of appeals every year, to
decide a few dozen more. For all these reasons, an inalienability ruleobjectors can credibly threaten to file an appeal and see it through to fruition, it may be possible
for legitimate objectors to collect a premium over the expected value of their appeals in exchange
for refraining from filing their appeals during the thirty-day period. To this extent, even an
inalienability rule cannot completely eliminate class counsel's incentives to pay premiums to
avoid appeals.
156. Kozel and Rosenberg's analysis shows that any ability an objector might have to "throw"
an appeal in exchange for later collecting a settlement from class counsel would be thwarted by
the unenforceability of any such agreement: once the objector lost his or her appeal, class counsel
would have no incentive to pay the agreed sum because the agreement could not be enforced by
the objector. See Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 143, at 1864-66 (making a similar argument for
why plaintiffs will not "throw" summary judgment motions).
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not quick-pay provisions, ex post sanctions, or large appellate bondsmay very well be the most effective solution to objector blackmail.
VI. CONCLUSION

For many years, courts and commentators have been concerned
with the ability of class action objectors to blackmail class counsel by
filing meritless appeals that could delay the final resolution of
settlements for months or years. In response, courts and
commentators have proposed, and in some cases adopted, somewhat
draconian countermeasures that are likely to discourage both
blackmail-minded and legitimate objectors from participating in class
action litigation. In doing so, courts and commentators have been
unaware that class counsel had already developed a more effective
and better-tailored solution to the blackmail problem: the quick-pay
provision. These provisions permit class counsel to receive their fee
awards before appeals from the settlement are resolved. In 2006,
already one-third of all class action settlements, and nearly 80 percent
of securities settlements, included these provisions.
Although quick-pay provisions are a clever response to the
blackmail problem, they come with several limitations. These
limitations render them a suboptimal solution to objector blackmail.
Drawing on property law scholarship, I have shown that an
inalienability rule-a rule that would prohibit objectors from settling
their appeals-is preferable. Such a rule would completely eliminate
the ability of objectors to collect premiums from class counsel
unrelated to the merits of their appeals, and at the same time it would
keep access to appellate review fully open for those class members
with genuine complaints about a class action settlement. An
inalienability rule is therefore the optimal solution to the blackmail
threat.

